10. ACM-EC 2009: Stanford, California, USA

John Chuang, Lance Fortnow, Pearl Pu (Eds.): Proceedings 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2009), Stanford, California, USA, July 6--10, 2009. ACM 2009, ISBN 978-1-60558-458-4

Session 1

Vahab S. Mirrokni, Alexander Skopalik:
On the complexity of nash dynamics and sink equilibria. 1-10
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Jacek Sroka, Andrew Dowell, Michael J. Wooldridge, Peter McBurney, Nicholas R. Jennings:
On representing coalitional games with externalities. 11-20
Hervé Moulin:
Pricing traffic in a spanning network. 21-30
Felix A. Fischer, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alex Samorodnitsky:
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees. 31-40

Session 2

Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline:
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. 41-50
David Robert Martin Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions. 51-60
Moshe Babaioff, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations. 61-70
Nikhil R. Devenur, Thomas P. Hayes:
The adwords problem: online keyword matching with budgeted bidders under random permutations. 71-78

Session 3

Moshe Babaioff, Yogeshwer Sharma, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms: extended abstract. 79-88
Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes:
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. 89-98
Nikhil R. Devanur, Sham M. Kakade:
The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions. 99-106
Renato D. Gomes, Kane S. Sweeney:
Bayes-nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction. 107-108

Session 4

Nicolas S. Lambert, Yoav Shoham:
Eliciting truthful answers to multiple-choice questions. 109-118
Dominic DiPalantino, Milan Vojnovic:
Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions. 119-128
Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. 129-138
Jiaqian Zheng, Xiaoyuan Wu, Junyu Niu, Alvaro Bolivar:
Substitutes or complements: another step forward in recommendations. 139-146

Session 5

Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. 147-156
David M. Rahman:
But who will monitor the monitor? 157-158
Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna:
Network bargaining: algorithms and structural results. 159-168
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. 169-176

Session 6

Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Approximate mechanism design without money. 177-186
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, Aravind Srinivasan:
On random sampling auctions for digital goods. 187-196
Paul Harrenstein, Mathijs de Weerdt, Vincent Conitzer:
A qualitative vickrey auction. 197-206
Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy R. Greenwald:
Destroy to save. 207-214

Session 7

Bobji Mungamuru, Hector Garcia-Molina:
Managing the quality of CPC traffic. 215-224
Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Simple versus optimal mechanisms. 225-234
Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms. 235-242
Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Revenue submodularity. 243-252

Session 8

Michael Ostrovsky:
Information aggregation in dynamic markets with strategic traders. 253-254
Shipra Agrawal, Erick Delage, Mark Peters, Zizhuo Wang, Yinyu Ye:
A unified framework for dynamic pari-mutuel information market design. 255-264
Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock:
Collective revelation: a mechanism for self-verified, weighted, and truthful predictions. 265-274
Nikolay Archak, Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis:
Modeling volatility in prediction markets. 275-284

Session 9

Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour:
The price of uncertainty. 285-294
Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen:
Policy teaching through reward function learning. 295-304
Shuchi Chawla, Feng Niu:
The price of anarchy in bertrand games. 305-314
Milan Bradonjic, Gunes Ercal-Ozkaya, Adam Meyerson, Alan Roytman:
On the price of mediation. 315-324

Session 10

Eytan Bakshy, Brian Karrer, Lada A. Adamic:
Social influence and the diffusion of user-created content. 325-334
Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert:
Social lending. 335-344
Paul Resnick, Rahul Sami:
Sybilproof transitive trust protocols. 345-354
Oren Ben-Zwi, Danny Hermelin, Daniel Lokshtanov, Ilan Newman:
An exact almost optimal algorithm for target set selection in social networks. 355-362