

# Errata for “Unifying Consensus and Atomic Commitment for Effective Cloud Data Management”

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## ABSTRACT

This errata article discusses and corrects a minor error in our work published in VLDB 2019. The discrepancy specifically pertains to Algorithms 3 and 4. The algorithms presented in the paper are biased towards a *commit* decision in a specific failure scenario. We explain the error using an example before correcting the algorithm.

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## 1 PROBLEM

This article is a response to Chockler and Gotsman [1] who raised a minor error in our work [2]. We explain the problem in Algorithm 3 of [2]. The algorithm elects a leader and identifies the *commit* or *abort* value for a terminating transaction. In both the normal execution as well as failure recovery, every newly elected coordinator executes Algorithm 3 to choose a value to propose. Now consider the following scenario where 5 sites are attempting to terminate a transaction:

- (1) Suppose that all initial values are commit. A commit is selected to be proposed by the first leader  $\mathcal{L}1$ , but it fails after setting  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{commit}$  at just a single cohort,  $C1$ .
- (2) Another leader,  $\mathcal{L}2$ , gets elected, but now the cohort  $C1$  with  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{commit}$  stops responding. Leader  $\mathcal{L}2$  thus picks abort as its value since no cohort responded with its Decision or  $\text{AcceptVal}$  set. Leader  $\mathcal{L}2$  proceeds to set  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{abort}$  at a quorum that does not include the cohort  $C1$ . Then, it manages to decide on abort (i.e.,  $\text{Decision} = \text{True}$  and  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{abort}$ ) at exactly one cohort,  $C2$ , and crashes.
- (3) The third leader  $\mathcal{L}3$  gets elected, and manages to receive a response from cohort  $C1$  with  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{commit}$ , but not from  $C2$  that has both  $\text{Decision} = \text{True}$  and  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{abort}$  set. For example, it may hear from a quorum which includes one cohort  $C3$  with  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{abort}$  (since that was finalised at a quorum by the second leader) and one cohort  $C1$  with  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{commit}$  (the one set by the first leader). According to the code in Algorithm 3,  $\mathcal{L}3$  will adopt

commit as its  $\text{AcceptVal}$  value (line 5) even though cohort  $C3$  has a higher  $\text{AcceptNum}$  than  $C1$ , and  $\mathcal{L}3$  may subsequently commit a transaction that was already aborted.

While Algorithm 3 is used for PAC, the same behavior (and hence the error) exists in Algorithm 4 used for G-PAC. We note that the error does not affect the performance evaluations presented in the paper.

## 2 SOLUTION

The error is caused mainly due to the condition in Line 5 of Algorithm 3 (and Line 6 of Algorithm 4). To mitigate the above discussed problem, lines 5-7 in Algorithm 3 of the paper must be changed to:

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### Correction to Algorithm 3

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5: else if at least one response with  $\text{AcceptVal} \neq \perp$   
6: /* Decision is True for none in the received responses. */  
   then  
7:    $\text{AcceptVal} \leftarrow \text{AcceptVal}$  of the highest  $\text{AcceptNum}$ 
```

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Note that this change in condition is similar to the corresponding condition in Paxos. In the example discussed earlier, if the changed pseudocode is used, the third leader  $\mathcal{L}3$  will propose  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{abort}$ . This is because the  $\text{AcceptNum}$  of cohort  $C1$  (with  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{commit}$  set by the first leader) is strictly lower than the  $\text{AcceptNum}$  of cohort  $C3$  (with  $\text{AcceptVal} = \text{abort}$  set by the second leader). The higher  $\text{AcceptNum}$  of  $C3$  is guaranteed due to quorum intersection: at least one site knows the ballot  $B1$  of the first leader, and any successful new leader (e.g.,  $\mathcal{L}2$ ) must have a ballot  $B2 > B1$  (otherwise the overlapping site will reject the second leader’s request). By picking the value with the highest  $\text{AcceptNum}$ , a decided value will not be overridden. In the example,  $\mathcal{L}3$  picks abort as the chosen value.

A similar correction is also applied to Algorithm 4.

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### Correction to Algorithm 4

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6: else if a majority of replicas of at least one shard respond  
   and at least one of them has  $\text{AcceptVal} \neq \perp$   
7: /* Decision is True for none in the SUPER-MAJORITY. */  
   then  
8:    $\text{AcceptVal} \leftarrow \text{AcceptVal}$  of the highest  $\text{AcceptNum}$  across  
   all the received responses
```

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## REFERENCES

- [1] Gregory Chockler and Alexey Gotsman. [n.d.]. Private Communication. ([n.d.]).
- [2] Sujaya Maiyya, Faisal Nawab, Divyakant Agrawal, and Amr El Abbadi. 2019. Unifying consensus and atomic commitment for effective cloud data management. *Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment* 12, 5 (2019), 611–623.

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