Secure Data Outsourcing

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ABSTRACT

The networked and increasingly ubiquitous nature of today's data management services mandates assurances to detect and deter malicious or faulty behavior. This is particularly relevant for outsourced data frameworks in which clients place data management with specialized service providers. Clients are reluctant to place sensitive data under the control of a foreign party without assurances of confidentiality. Additionally, once outsourced, privacy and data access correctness (data integrity and query completeness) become paramount. Today's solutions are fundamentally insecure and vulnerable to illicit behavior, because they do not handle these dimensions.

In this tutorial we will explore how to design and build robust, efficient, and scalable data outsourcing mechanisms providing strong security assurances of (1) *correctness*, (2) *confidentiality*, and (3) data access *privacy*.

There exists a strong relationship between such assurances; for example, the lack of access pattern privacy usually allows for statistical attacks compromising data confidentiality. Confidentiality can be achieved by data encryption. However, to be practical, outsourced data services should allow expressive client queries (e.g., relational joins with arbitrary predicates) without compromising confidentiality. This is a hard problem because decryption keys cannot be directly provided to potentially untrusted servers. Moreover, if the remote server cannot be fully trusted, protocol correctness become essential. Therefore, solutions that do not address all three dimensions are incomplete and insecure.

1. OVERVIEW

Today, sensitive data is being managed on remote servers maintained by third party outsourcing vendors. This is because the total cost of data management is 5–10 times higher than the initial acquisition costs [9]. In such an outsourced "database as a service" [10] model, *clients* outsource data management to a "database service provider" that provides online access mechanisms for querying and managing the hosted data sets.

This is advantageous and significantly more affordable for parties with limited abilities to manage large in-house data centers of potentially large resource footprints. By comparison, database service providers – ranging from corporate-level services such as the IBM Data Center Outsourcing Services to personal level database hosting – have the advantage of expertize consolidation. More-over they are likely to be able to offer the service much cheaper, with increased service availability (e.g. uptime) guarantees.

Notwithstanding these clear advantages, a data outsourcing paradigm faces significant challenges to widespread adoption, especially in an online, untrusted environment. Current privacy guarantees of such services are at best declarative and often subject customers to unreasonable fine-print clauses—e.g., allowing the server operator (and thus malicious attackers gaining access to its systems) to use customer behavior and content for commercial, profiling, or governmental surveillance purposes. Clients are naturally reluctant to place sensitive data under the control of a foreign party without strong security assurances of *correctness* [8, 11, 15, 17, 18], *confidentiality* [1, 2], and data access *privacy* [3–7,12–14,16,19,20]. These assurances are essential for data outsourcing to become a sound and truly viable alternative to in-house data management. However, developing assurance mechanisms in such frameworks is challenging because the data is placed under the authority of an external party whose honest behavior is not guaranteed but rather needs to be ensured by this very solution.

In this tutorial, we will explore the challenges of designing and implementing robust, efficient, and scalable relational data outsourcing mechanisms, with strong security assurances of *correctness*, *confidentiality*, and data access *privacy*. This is important because today's outsourced data services are fundamentally insecure and vulnerable to illicit behavior, because they do not handle all three dimensions consistently and there exists a strong relationship between such assurances: e.g., the lack of access pattern privacy usually allows for statistical attacks compromising data confidentiality. Even if privacy and confidentiality are in place, to be practical, outsourced data services should allow sufficiently expressive client queries (e.g., relational operators such as JOINs with arbitrary predicates) without compromising confidentiality. This is a hard problem because in most cases decryption keys cannot be directly provided to potentially untrusted database servers. Moreover, result completeness and data integrity (i.e., correctness) become essential. Therefore, solutions that do not address these di-

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

Figure 1: Secure Data Outsourcing: assurances of correctness, confidentiality and access privacy.

mensions are incomplete and insecure.

We will explore designs for outsourced relational data query mechanisms that (i) ensure queries have been executed with *integrity and completeness* over their respective target data sets, (ii) allow queries to be executed with *confidentiality* over encrypted data, (iii) guarantee the *privacy* of client queries and data access patterns. We will discuss protocols that adapt to the existence of *trusted hardware* — so critical functionality can be delegated securely from clients to servers and increased assurance levels can be achieved more efficiently. Moreover, it is important to design for scalability to large data sets and high query throughputs. We discuss implementation issues in achieving the above three security assurances:

Correctness. Clients should be able to verify the integrity and completeness of any results the server returns. For example, when executing a JOIN query, they should be able to verify that the server returned *all* matching tuples.

Confidentiality. The data being stored on the server should not be decipherable either during transit between the client and the server, or at the server side, even in the case when the server is malicious.

Access Privacy. An intruder or a malicious server should not be able to perform statistical attacks by exploiting query patterns. For example, it should not be able to compromise data confidentiality by correlating known public information with frequently queried data items.

2. BIOGRAPHY OF SPEAKER

Radu Sion is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science in Stony Brook University and the director of the Network Security and Applied Cryptography Laboratory. His research focuses on data security and information assurance mechanisms. Collaborators and funding partners include Motorola Labs, IBM Research, the Stony Brook Center of Excellence in Wireless and Information Technology CEWIT, the Stony Brook Office for the Vice-President for Research and the National Science Foundation.

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