2. ACM-EC 2000: Minneapolis, MN, USA

• Noam Nisan:
  Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions. 1-12
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Rica Gonen, Daniel J. Lehmann:
  Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics. 13-20
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Peter R. Wurman, Michael P. Wellman:
  AkBA: a progressive, anonymous-price combinatorial auction. 21-29
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Koji Kamei:
  An efficient approximate algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. 30-37
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Mark Rosenstein:
  What is actually taking place on web sites: e-commerce lessons from web server logs. 38-43
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Karen Clay, Ramayya Krishnan, Eric Wolff:
  Pricing strategies on the Web: evidence from the online book industry. 44-55
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Daniel A. Menascé, Virgilio Almeida, Rudolf H. Riedi, Flávia Ribeiro, Rodrigo C. Fonseca, Wagner Meira Jr.:
  In search of invariants for e-business workloads. 56-65
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Kevin Leyton-Brown, Mark Pearson, Yoav Shoham:
  Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms. 66-76
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Cary A. Deck, Bart J. Wilson:
  Interactions of automated pricing algorithms: an experimental investigation. 77-85
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Gaurav Tewari, Pattie Maes:
  Design and implementation of an agent-based intermediary infrastructure for electronic markets. 86-94
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Christopher H. Brooks, Edmund H. Durfee, Rajarshi Das:
  Price wars and niche discovery in an information economy. 95-106
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Geoffrey G. Parker, Marshall W. van Alstyne:
  Internetwork externalities and free information goods. 107-116
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Jeffrey O. Kephart, Scott A. Fay:
  Competitive bundling of categorized information goods. 117-127
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Joan Morris, Peter Ree, Pattie Maes:
  Sardine: dynamic seller strategies in an auction marketplace. 128-134
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Neveen I. Farag, Marshall W. van Alstyne:
  Information technology - a source of friction? an analytical model of how firms combat price competition online. 135-144
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• David Maxwell Chickering, David Heckerman:
  Targeted advertising with inventory management. 145-149
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Chrysanthos Dellarocas:
  Immunizing online reputation reporting systems against unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior. 150-157
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Badrul M. Sarwar, George Karypis, Joseph A. Konstan, John Riedl:
  Analysis of recommendation algorithms for e-commerce. 158-167
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Juhnyoung Lee, Mark Podlaseck:
  Using a starfield visualization for analyzing product performance of online stores. 168-175
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Robert M. Arlein, Ben Jai, Markus Jakobsson, Fabian Monrose, Michael K. Reiter:
  Privacy-preserving global customization. 176-184
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Debra E. VanderMeer, Kaushik Dutta, Anindya Datta, Krithi Ramamritham, Shamkant B. Navathe:
  Enabling scalable online personalization on the Web. 185-196
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Ewa Callahan, Jürgen Koenemann:
  A comparative usability evaluation of user interfaces for online product catalog. 197-206
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Roman Ginis, K. Mani Chandy:
  Micro-option: a method for optimal selection and atomic reservation of distributed resources in a free market environment. 207-214
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Stefano Puglia, Robert Carter, Ravi Jain:
  MultECommerce: a distributed architecture for collaborative shopping on the WWW. 215-224
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Mark Klein, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar:
  An exception-handling architecture for open electronic marketplaces of contract net software agents. 225-232
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
  Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. 233-241
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen:
  Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms. 242-252
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• Kevin Leyton-Brown, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz:
  Bidding clubs: institutionalized collusion in auctions. 253-259
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX
• William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Fredrik Ygge:
  Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation. 260-269
  Electronic Edition (ACM DL) BibTeX